TY  - JOUR
AU  - Sun, Fang
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026/10/09
TI  - Green Innovation and Environmental Regulation in Corporate Carbon Abatement
JO  - Journal of Numerical Simulations in Physics and Mathematics
T2  - Journal of Numerical Simulations in Physics and Mathematics
JF  - Journal of Numerical Simulations in Physics and Mathematics
VL  - 3
IS  - 1
SP  - 19
EP  - 37
DO  - 10.62762/JNSPM.2026.289453
UR  - https://www.icck.org/article/abs/JNSPM.2026.289453
KW  - Corporate carbon abatement
KW  - green innovation
KW  - environmental regulation
KW  - regulatory thresholds
KW  - green market preference
AB  - Corporate carbon abatement is commonly modeled as a direct and continuous response to environmental regulation or green innovation. Such representations cannot fully explain persistent differences among firms facing similar policy conditions or distinguish the pressure required to initiate a low-carbon transition from that needed to sustain it. This study develops a three-state continuous-time model linking corporate carbon abatement, accumulated green innovation, and effective regulatory pressure, with green market preference treated as an external demand-pull parameter. Green innovation lowers the marginal cost of abatement, abatement generates learning and commercial returns to innovation, and regulatory pressure responds to residual emissions while relaxing as abatement and credible green capability improve. The regulation--innovation channel is non-monotonic: moderate pressure strengthens innovation incentives, whereas the marginal stimulus declines at high pressure. The analysis combines equilibrium and stability analysis, saddle-node verification, attraction-basin classification, temporary-policy simulations, regime mapping, and global sensitivity analysis. Under the baseline configuration, two locally stable equilibria are separated by a saddle, and nondegenerate saddle-node thresholds generate hysteresis between low- and high-abatement states. Green market preference lowers the transition threshold, while temporary regulation succeeds only when both intensity and duration are sufficient. Regulatory adjustment may generate damped oscillatory modes, but no Hopf crossing is detected within the examined range. The findings show that regulatory pressure acts as an adaptive state-transition mechanism through which initial capability, policy timing, and market demand shape persistent corporate carbon-abatement outcomes. Broader stress tests confirm that bistability is conditional and can disappear under weak innovation capacity or combined adverse structural conditions. The numerical procedures developed here---multistart root finding,adaptive Runge--Kutta integration, analytical Jacobian evaluation,and Latin-hypercube sensitivity design---are transferable tocontinuous-time state-transition models in other applied domains.
SN  - 3068-9082
PB  - Institute of Central Computation and Knowledge
LA  - English
ER  - 

@article{Sun2026Green,
  author = {Fang Sun},
  title = {Green Innovation and Environmental Regulation in Corporate Carbon Abatement},
  journal = {Journal of Numerical Simulations in Physics and Mathematics},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {3},
  number = {1},
  pages = {19-37},
  doi = {10.62762/JNSPM.2026.289453},
  url = {https://www.icck.org/article/abs/JNSPM.2026.289453},
  abstract = {Corporate carbon abatement is commonly modeled as a direct and continuous response to environmental regulation or green innovation. Such representations cannot fully explain persistent differences among firms facing similar policy conditions or distinguish the pressure required to initiate a low-carbon transition from that needed to sustain it. This study develops a three-state continuous-time model linking corporate carbon abatement, accumulated green innovation, and effective regulatory pressure, with green market preference treated as an external demand-pull parameter. Green innovation lowers the marginal cost of abatement, abatement generates learning and commercial returns to innovation, and regulatory pressure responds to residual emissions while relaxing as abatement and credible green capability improve. The regulation--innovation channel is non-monotonic: moderate pressure strengthens innovation incentives, whereas the marginal stimulus declines at high pressure. The analysis combines equilibrium and stability analysis, saddle-node verification, attraction-basin classification, temporary-policy simulations, regime mapping, and global sensitivity analysis. Under the baseline configuration, two locally stable equilibria are separated by a saddle, and nondegenerate saddle-node thresholds generate hysteresis between low- and high-abatement states. Green market preference lowers the transition threshold, while temporary regulation succeeds only when both intensity and duration are sufficient. Regulatory adjustment may generate damped oscillatory modes, but no Hopf crossing is detected within the examined range. The findings show that regulatory pressure acts as an adaptive state-transition mechanism through which initial capability, policy timing, and market demand shape persistent corporate carbon-abatement outcomes. Broader stress tests confirm that bistability is conditional and can disappear under weak innovation capacity or combined adverse structural conditions. The numerical procedures developed here---multistart root finding,adaptive Runge--Kutta integration, analytical Jacobian evaluation,and Latin-hypercube sensitivity design---are transferable tocontinuous-time state-transition models in other applied domains.},
  keywords = {Corporate carbon abatement, green innovation, environmental regulation, regulatory thresholds, green market preference},
  issn = {3068-9082},
  publisher = {Institute of Central Computation and Knowledge}
}