Based on the perspective of industry-education integration, this paper constructs an evolutionary game dynamic model of "enterprises (EN) - universities and research institutions (RI)". It examines the dynamic mechanism of cultivating intelligent logistics talent in the Guangdong, Hong Kong, and Macao Greater Bay Area and identifies the conditions for the stability of this mechanism. The conclusions indicate that under the strategy of "passive R&D" chosen by RI, when EN opts to "continue cooperation", the benefits outweigh those of "withdrawal". Similarly, under the "withdrawal" strategy, if EN continues to cooperate, the benefits are greater compared to withdrawing. Furthermore, under EN's... More >

Both the shadow banking and the government regulatory agencies are bounded rational subjects, and they will constantly adjust the game according to the change of the other party's strategy when making decisions. Therefore, it has become an effective way to explore the government regulatory issues of China's shadow banking with the application of evolutionary game theory. By constructing the evolutionary game model of shadow banking and government regulatory authorities, this paper analyzes the dynamic adjustment relationship between the strategy choice of shadow banking and government regulatory authorities, and concludes that the operating income and cost of shadow banking, the intensity of... More >