TY  - JOUR
AU  - Liu, Shuangshuang
AU  - Hölbl, Marko
AU  - III, Renato R. Maaliw
AU  - Mia, Md. Solaiman
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026/06/14
TI  - Cryptanalysis of an Authentication Protocol for Edge-Centric Maritime Transportation Systems
JO  - Journal of Reliable and Secure Computing
T2  - Journal of Reliable and Secure Computing
JF  - Journal of Reliable and Secure Computing
VL  - 2
IS  - 2
SP  - 104
EP  - 110
DO  - 10.62762/JRSC.2026.765456
UR  - https://www.icck.org/article/abs/JRSC.2026.765456
KW  - edge computing
KW  - intelligent maritime transportation systems
KW  - authentication protocol
KW  - temporary random number leakage attack
KW  - privileged insider attack
KW  - perfect forward secrecy
AB  - With the rapid development of edge computing and intelligent maritime transportation systems, secure authentication and key agreement protocols have become essential for protecting communications among maritime entities and edge devices. Recently, Mahmood et al. proposed an authentication protocol for edge-centric maritime transportation systems, claiming that their scheme can resist various security attacks while ensuring efficient communication. However, practical maritime environments still face many security threats. In addition, edge infrastructures usually have limited resources. Therefore, authentication protocols require rigorous security evaluation. In this paper, we perform a cryptanalysis of Mahmood et al.'s protocol and reveal several critical security weaknesses. We demonstrate that the protocol is vulnerable to temporary random-number leakage attacks and privileged insider attacks, which may enable adversaries to compromise authentication information and session security. Moreover, we show that the protocol fails to provide perfect forward secrecy, meaning that previously established session keys may be exposed once long-term secret credentials are compromised. These vulnerabilities reduce the security reliability and practical applicability of the original scheme in real-world maritime transportation environments. To address these issues, we discuss several measures for improvement and provide recommendations to strengthen the protocol's security. Our analysis provides useful guidance for the future design of secure authentication protocols in edge-centric maritime transportation systems.
SN  - 3070-6424
PB  - Institute of Central Computation and Knowledge
LA  - English
ER  - 

@article{Liu2026Cryptanaly,
  author = {Shuangshuang Liu and Marko Hölbl and Renato R. Maaliw III and Md. Solaiman Mia},
  title = {Cryptanalysis of an Authentication Protocol for Edge-Centric Maritime Transportation Systems},
  journal = {Journal of Reliable and Secure Computing},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {2},
  number = {2},
  pages = {104-110},
  doi = {10.62762/JRSC.2026.765456},
  url = {https://www.icck.org/article/abs/JRSC.2026.765456},
  abstract = {With the rapid development of edge computing and intelligent maritime transportation systems, secure authentication and key agreement protocols have become essential for protecting communications among maritime entities and edge devices. Recently, Mahmood et al. proposed an authentication protocol for edge-centric maritime transportation systems, claiming that their scheme can resist various security attacks while ensuring efficient communication. However, practical maritime environments still face many security threats. In addition, edge infrastructures usually have limited resources. Therefore, authentication protocols require rigorous security evaluation. In this paper, we perform a cryptanalysis of Mahmood et al.'s protocol and reveal several critical security weaknesses. We demonstrate that the protocol is vulnerable to temporary random-number leakage attacks and privileged insider attacks, which may enable adversaries to compromise authentication information and session security. Moreover, we show that the protocol fails to provide perfect forward secrecy, meaning that previously established session keys may be exposed once long-term secret credentials are compromised. These vulnerabilities reduce the security reliability and practical applicability of the original scheme in real-world maritime transportation environments. To address these issues, we discuss several measures for improvement and provide recommendations to strengthen the protocol's security. Our analysis provides useful guidance for the future design of secure authentication protocols in edge-centric maritime transportation systems.},
  keywords = {edge computing, intelligent maritime transportation systems, authentication protocol, temporary random number leakage attack, privileged insider attack, perfect forward secrecy},
  issn = {3070-6424},
  publisher = {Institute of Central Computation and Knowledge}
}