Paying for Trust at the Edge: Secure, Lightweight, Deadline-Aware Named Data Networking for Edge-Cloud Compute Orchestration
Research Article  ·  Published: 21 September 2026
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Journal of Reliable and Secure Computing
Volume 2, Issue 3, 2026: 212-232
Research Article Open Access

Paying for Trust at the Edge: Secure, Lightweight, Deadline-Aware Named Data Networking for Edge-Cloud Compute Orchestration

1 Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Indian Institute of Information Technology Raichur, Raichur 584102, India
* Corresponding Author: Mehbub Alam, [email protected]
Volume 2, Issue 3
You have full access to this open access article · CC BY 4.0 License

Article Information

Abstract

Edge nodes are among the most resource-constrained components of computing infrastructure, yet security verification competes directly with application execution for limited compute resources. In Named Data Networking (NDN), each retrieved object carries a producer signature whose verification consumes edge CPU cycles, while existing cryptographic and orchestration studies rarely quantify its impact on service reliability. This paper develops SLED, a secure edge--cloud framework over NDN that incorporates a Security Verification Engine (SVE) into the edge compute budget, explicitly coupling verification occupancy with named-function execution. SLED combines DACSIR, which prices verification into deadline-aware cache-assisted routing; LSAV, which amortises one Ed25519 signature over a Merkle tree covering $B$ Data packets and re-validates cached objects using symmetric tokens within a trust domain; and DREP, which dynamically provisions and reclaims cloud burst workers according to edge utilisation. Cryptographic costs measured on a host CPU were scaled to individual tiers using modelling factors and incorporated into a discrete-event simulator. At 6,000 Interests per second, SLED achieves a deadline satisfaction ratio of 0.978, compared with 0.952 for the same datapath using per-packet RSA-2048 and 0.600 for vanilla NDN, while reducing mean per-request verification latency from 7,150.5 to 258.4~$\mu$s and recovering 94.5% of the insecure upper-bound utility. Replacing RSA-2048 with Ed25519 alone yields little improvement, indicating that reliability is more sensitive to verification frequency than to the cryptographic primitive in the evaluated configurations. These results demonstrate that verification should be treated as a first-class resource cost and jointly optimised with workload placement and deadline requirements, while noting that system-level results are simulation-based and per-tier scaling factors are estimated.

Graphical Abstract

Paying for Trust at the Edge: Secure, Lightweight, Deadline-Aware Named Data Networking for Edge-Cloud Compute Orchestration

Keywords

secure edge computing trustworthy edge infrastructure cryptographic verification overhead resource-efficient security named data networking deadline-aware service reliability secure edge-cloud orchestration signature amortisation

Data Availability Statement

The data that support the findings of this study are openly available. The discrete-event simulator, cryptographic benchmarking code, and experimental results are publicly accessible at https://github.com/mehbub160/SLED-NDN under an open-source licence.

Funding

This work was supported without any funding.

Conflicts of Interest

Mehbub Alam served as an Editorial Board Member of the Journal of Reliable and Secure Computing at the time of manuscript submission. To ensure the integrity of the peer-review process, Mehbub Alam was not involved in the editorial handling, peer review, or decision-making process for this manuscript, which was handled independently by another editor. The remaining authors declare no conflicts of interest.

AI Use Statement

The author declares that ChatGPT was used for language editing and grammar refinement of the manuscript. The authors have carefully reviewed, revised, and verified the AI-assisted output and take full responsibility for the content of the manuscript.

Ethical Approval and Consent to Participate

Not applicable.

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Cite This Article

APA Style
Alam, M. (2026). Paying for Trust at the Edge: Secure, Lightweight, Deadline-Aware Named Data Networking for Edge-Cloud Compute Orchestration. Journal of Reliable and Secure Computing, 2(3), 212-232. https://doi.org/10.62762/JRSC.2026.615829
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Compatible with EndNote, Zotero, Mendeley, and other reference managers
TY  - JOUR
AU  - Alam, Mehbub
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026/09/21
TI  - Paying for Trust at the Edge: Secure, Lightweight, Deadline-Aware Named Data Networking for Edge-Cloud Compute Orchestration
JO  - Journal of Reliable and Secure Computing
T2  - Journal of Reliable and Secure Computing
JF  - Journal of Reliable and Secure Computing
VL  - 2
IS  - 3
SP  - 212
EP  - 232
DO  - 10.62762/JRSC.2026.615829
UR  - https://www.icck.org/article/abs/JRSC.2026.615829
KW  - secure edge computing
KW  - trustworthy edge infrastructure
KW  - cryptographic verification overhead
KW  - resource-efficient security
KW  - named data networking
KW  - deadline-aware service reliability
KW  - secure edge-cloud orchestration
KW  - signature amortisation
AB  - Edge nodes are among the most resource-constrained components of computing infrastructure, yet security verification competes directly with application execution for limited compute resources. In Named Data Networking (NDN), each retrieved object carries a producer signature whose verification consumes edge CPU cycles, while existing cryptographic and orchestration studies rarely quantify its impact on service reliability. This paper develops SLED, a secure edge--cloud framework over NDN that incorporates a Security Verification Engine (SVE) into the edge compute budget, explicitly coupling verification occupancy with named-function execution. SLED combines DACSIR, which prices verification into deadline-aware cache-assisted routing; LSAV, which amortises one Ed25519 signature over a Merkle tree covering $B$ Data packets and re-validates cached objects using symmetric tokens within a trust domain; and DREP, which dynamically provisions and reclaims cloud burst workers according to edge utilisation. Cryptographic costs measured on a host CPU were scaled to individual tiers using modelling factors and incorporated into a discrete-event simulator. At 6,000 Interests per second, SLED achieves a deadline satisfaction ratio of 0.978, compared with 0.952 for the same datapath using per-packet RSA-2048 and 0.600 for vanilla NDN, while reducing mean per-request verification latency from 7,150.5 to 258.4~$\mu$s and recovering 94.5% of the insecure upper-bound utility. Replacing RSA-2048 with Ed25519 alone yields little improvement, indicating that reliability is more sensitive to verification frequency than to the cryptographic primitive in the evaluated configurations. These results demonstrate that verification should be treated as a first-class resource cost and jointly optimised with workload placement and deadline requirements, while noting that system-level results are simulation-based and per-tier scaling factors are estimated.
SN  - 3070-6424
PB  - Institute of Central Computation and Knowledge
LA  - English
ER  - 
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Compatible with LaTeX, BibTeX, and other reference managers
@article{Alam2026Paying,
  author = {Mehbub Alam},
  title = {Paying for Trust at the Edge: Secure, Lightweight, Deadline-Aware Named Data Networking for Edge-Cloud Compute Orchestration},
  journal = {Journal of Reliable and Secure Computing},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {2},
  number = {3},
  pages = {212-232},
  doi = {10.62762/JRSC.2026.615829},
  url = {https://www.icck.org/article/abs/JRSC.2026.615829},
  abstract = {Edge nodes are among the most resource-constrained components of computing infrastructure, yet security verification competes directly with application execution for limited compute resources. In Named Data Networking (NDN), each retrieved object carries a producer signature whose verification consumes edge CPU cycles, while existing cryptographic and orchestration studies rarely quantify its impact on service reliability. This paper develops SLED, a secure edge--cloud framework over NDN that incorporates a Security Verification Engine (SVE) into the edge compute budget, explicitly coupling verification occupancy with named-function execution. SLED combines DACSIR, which prices verification into deadline-aware cache-assisted routing; LSAV, which amortises one Ed25519 signature over a Merkle tree covering \$B\$ Data packets and re-validates cached objects using symmetric tokens within a trust domain; and DREP, which dynamically provisions and reclaims cloud burst workers according to edge utilisation. Cryptographic costs measured on a host CPU were scaled to individual tiers using modelling factors and incorporated into a discrete-event simulator. At 6,000 Interests per second, SLED achieves a deadline satisfaction ratio of 0.978, compared with 0.952 for the same datapath using per-packet RSA-2048 and 0.600 for vanilla NDN, while reducing mean per-request verification latency from 7,150.5 to 258.4~\$\mu\$s and recovering 94.5\% of the insecure upper-bound utility. Replacing RSA-2048 with Ed25519 alone yields little improvement, indicating that reliability is more sensitive to verification frequency than to the cryptographic primitive in the evaluated configurations. These results demonstrate that verification should be treated as a first-class resource cost and jointly optimised with workload placement and deadline requirements, while noting that system-level results are simulation-based and per-tier scaling factors are estimated.},
  keywords = {secure edge computing, trustworthy edge infrastructure, cryptographic verification overhead, resource-efficient security, named data networking, deadline-aware service reliability, secure edge-cloud orchestration, signature amortisation},
  issn = {3070-6424},
  publisher = {Institute of Central Computation and Knowledge}
}

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