Preventive Maintenance and Competitive Strategies in IIoT-enable After-sales Markets: A Degradation Modeling and Game Theoretic Approach
Research Article  ·  Published: 30 July 2025
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ICCK Transactions on Systems Safety and Reliability
Volume 1, Issue 1, 2025: 21-42
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Preventive Maintenance and Competitive Strategies in IIoT-enable After-sales Markets: A Degradation Modeling and Game Theoretic Approach

1 School of Mathematics & Physics, Hulunbuir College, Hulun Buir 021008, China
2 School of Reliability and Systems Engineering, Beihang University, Beijing 100083, China
3 School of Management, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing 100081, China
* Corresponding Author: Qingan Qiu, [email protected]
Volume 1, Issue 1

Abstract

In the after-sales service market, understanding both the internal degradation of products and the external incentives within warranty period is crucial. Efforts into preventive maintenance can slow down the internal degradation, but these efforts are also influenced by external strategic services. Enabling an Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) platform for preventive maintenance requires carefully considering the benefits instead of merely increasing efforts. This paper addresses these complexities by first proposing an additive degradation model to characterize the internal deterioration of products and the impact of efforts into preventive maintenance. It then introduces a sequential game model based on the IIoT platform, examining interactions between manufacturers and cooperative competitors under three competitive schemes: traditional competition, monopolistic competition, and shared competition. Equilibrium prices for new products and after-sales services are used to analyze external incentives. Utilizing these equilibrium prices, the paper derives profit and reliability functions of manufacturers and cooperative competitors under each competition scheme. Finally, this study combines the efforts into preventive maintenance and the internal degradation mechanism of products through equilibrium reliability functions.

Graphical Abstract

Preventive Maintenance and Competitive Strategies in IIoT-enable After-sales Markets: A Degradation Modeling and Game Theoretic Approach

Keywords

product warranty after-sales service degradation process sequential games Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT)

Data Availability Statement

Data will be made available on request.

Funding

This work was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 72371030 and Grant 72001026; in part by the Natural Science Foundation of Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region under Grant 2025MS07010.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

Ethical Approval and Consent to Participate

Not applicable.

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Cited By (6)

  1. Chunyan Ling, Lechang Yang, Jingzhe Lei, Suk Joo Bae. Reliability-Based Preventive Maintenance for a Humanoid Robot System Under Dependent Competing Failure Processes. IEEE Transactions on Reliability, 2026 , 75 .
    [CrossRef]
  2. Lijun Shang, Kaiye Gao, Rui Peng. Random collaborative warranty pricing and out-of-warranty maintenance design for mission-epoch systems. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 2026 , 275 .
    [CrossRef]
  3. Shu Fang, Rongquan Yu, Di Wu, Rui Peng. Defending a capacitated series-parallel system with imperfect fault coverage. International Journal of General Systems, 2026 .
    [CrossRef]
  4. Qingqing Zhai, Ziyan Zhao, Guangze Pan. Optimal maintenance strategies for deteriorating products with heavy-tailed degradation pattern. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 2026 , 275 .
    [CrossRef]
  5. Zhuqing Miao, Tianzi Tian, Yige Li, Jun Yang. Generalized Fiducial Inference for Accelerated Life Tests With Failure-Free Life Based on Three-Parameter Weibull Distribution. IEEE Transactions on Reliability, 2026 , 75 .
    [CrossRef]
  6. Xiaodian Zhuang, Xiuwen Fu, Liudong Xing, Rui Peng. Network recovery for UAV-assisted IoTs after cascading failures with heterogeneous graph neural networks. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 2026 , 273 .
    [CrossRef]
* Citation data provided by Crossref Cited-by.

Cite This Article

APA Style
Liang, X., Yang, L., & Qiu, Q. (2025). Preventive Maintenance and Competitive Strategies in IIoT-enable After-sales Markets: A Degradation Modeling and Game Theoretic Approach. ICCK Transactions on Systems Safety and Reliability, 1(1), 21–42. https://doi.org/10.62762/TSSR.2025.782610
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TY  - JOUR
AU  - Liang, Xiaojun
AU  - Yang, Li
AU  - Qiu, Qingan
PY  - 2025
DA  - 2025/07/30
TI  - Preventive Maintenance and Competitive Strategies in IIoT-enable After-sales Markets: A Degradation Modeling and Game Theoretic Approach
JO  - ICCK Transactions on Systems Safety and Reliability
T2  - ICCK Transactions on Systems Safety and Reliability
JF  - ICCK Transactions on Systems Safety and Reliability
VL  - 1
IS  - 1
SP  - 21
EP  - 42
DO  - 10.62762/TSSR.2025.782610
UR  - https://www.icck.org/article/abs/TSSR.2025.782610
KW  - product warranty
KW  - after-sales service
KW  - degradation process
KW  - sequential games
KW  - Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT)
AB  - In the after-sales service market, understanding both the internal degradation of products and the external incentives within warranty period is crucial. Efforts into preventive maintenance can slow down the internal degradation, but these efforts are also influenced by external strategic services. Enabling an Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) platform for preventive maintenance requires carefully considering the benefits instead of merely increasing efforts. This paper addresses these complexities by first proposing an additive degradation model to characterize the internal deterioration of products and the impact of efforts into preventive maintenance. It then introduces a sequential game model based on the IIoT platform, examining interactions between manufacturers and cooperative competitors under three competitive schemes: traditional competition, monopolistic competition, and shared competition. Equilibrium prices for new products and after-sales services are used to analyze external incentives. Utilizing these equilibrium prices, the paper derives profit and reliability functions of manufacturers and cooperative competitors under each competition scheme. Finally, this study combines the efforts into preventive maintenance and the internal degradation mechanism of products through equilibrium reliability functions.
SN  - 3069-1087
PB  - Institute of Central Computation and Knowledge
LA  - English
ER  - 
BibTeX Format
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@article{Liang2025Preventive,
  author = {Xiaojun Liang and Li Yang and Qingan Qiu},
  title = {Preventive Maintenance and Competitive Strategies in IIoT-enable After-sales Markets: A Degradation Modeling and Game Theoretic Approach},
  journal = {ICCK Transactions on Systems Safety and Reliability},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {1},
  number = {1},
  pages = {21-42},
  doi = {10.62762/TSSR.2025.782610},
  url = {https://www.icck.org/article/abs/TSSR.2025.782610},
  abstract = {In the after-sales service market, understanding both the internal degradation of products and the external incentives within warranty period is crucial. Efforts into preventive maintenance can slow down the internal degradation, but these efforts are also influenced by external strategic services. Enabling an Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) platform for preventive maintenance requires carefully considering the benefits instead of merely increasing efforts. This paper addresses these complexities by first proposing an additive degradation model to characterize the internal deterioration of products and the impact of efforts into preventive maintenance. It then introduces a sequential game model based on the IIoT platform, examining interactions between manufacturers and cooperative competitors under three competitive schemes: traditional competition, monopolistic competition, and shared competition. Equilibrium prices for new products and after-sales services are used to analyze external incentives. Utilizing these equilibrium prices, the paper derives profit and reliability functions of manufacturers and cooperative competitors under each competition scheme. Finally, this study combines the efforts into preventive maintenance and the internal degradation mechanism of products through equilibrium reliability functions.},
  keywords = {product warranty, after-sales service, degradation process, sequential games, Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT)},
  issn = {3069-1087},
  publisher = {Institute of Central Computation and Knowledge}
}

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