Abstract
In the after-sales service market, understanding both the internal degradation of products and the external incentives within warranty period is crucial. Efforts into preventive maintenance can slow down the internal degradation, but these efforts are also influenced by external strategic services. Enabling an Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) platform for preventive maintenance requires carefully considering the benefits instead of merely increasing efforts. This paper addresses these complexities by first proposing an additive degradation model to characterize the internal deterioration of products and the impact of efforts into preventive maintenance. It then introduces a sequential game model based on the IIoT platform, examining interactions between manufacturers and cooperative competitors under three competitive schemes: traditional competition, monopolistic competition, and shared competition. Equilibrium prices for new products and after-sales services are used to analyze external incentives. Utilizing these equilibrium prices, the paper derives profit and reliability functions of manufacturers and cooperative competitors under each competition scheme. Finally, this study combines the efforts into preventive maintenance and the internal degradation mechanism of products through equilibrium reliability functions.
Keywords
product warranty
after-sales service
degradation process
sequential games
Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT)
Data Availability Statement
Data will be made available on request.
Funding
This work was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 72371030 and Grant 72001026; in part by the Natural Science Foundation of Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region under Grant 2025MS07010.
Conflicts of Interest
The authors declare no conflicts of interest.
Ethical Approval and Consent to Participate
Not applicable.
Cite This Article
APA Style
Liang, X., Yang, L., & Qiu, Q. (2025). Preventive Maintenance and Competitive Strategies in IIoT-enable After-sales Markets: A Degradation Modeling and Game Theoretic Approach. ICCK Transactions on Systems Safety and Reliability, 1(1), 21–42. https://doi.org/10.62762/TSSR.2025.782610
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