Volume 2, Issue 4, Journal of Social Systems and Policy Analysis
Volume 2, Issue 4, 2025
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Journal of Social Systems and Policy Analysis, Volume 2, Issue 4, 2025: 192-202

Open Access | Research Article | 17 December 2025
The Role of Central Bank Independence and Policy Transparency in Inflation Targeting: A Comparative Empirical Analysis of Five Countries
1 School of Economics, Jiangsu Normal University Kewen College, Xuzhou 221116, China
* Corresponding Author: Zhiming Song, [email protected]
ARK: ark:/57805/jsspa.2025.547905
Received: 02 August 2025, Accepted: 28 August 2025, Published: 17 December 2025  
Abstract
Inflation targeting has become a cornerstone framework for contemporary monetary policy governance, yet its effectiveness varies significantly across countries. This study employs panel data from five countries—New Zealand, Canada, South Korea, Poland, and South Africa—over the period 2010 to 2020 to empirically examine the impact mechanisms of central bank independence and policy transparency on inflation dynamics. The findings indicate that institutional independence of central banks significantly contributes to curbing inflation levels, enhancing policy credibility and implementation stability. Meanwhile, policy transparency effectively reduces inflation volatility by stabilizing public expectations and strengthening market communication. Macroeconomic control variables, including the share of foreign exchange reserves and GDP growth rate, also play a moderating role in inflation fluctuations. Regression results reveal that the two core variables are statistically significant at the 1% level, with robust explanatory power of the model. Further analysis incorporating institutional heterogeneity demonstrates path-dependent differences in policy design and outcomes between developed and transition economies. Building on these findings, this paper proposes relevant policy recommendations that underscore the importance of strengthening central bank independence, enhancing policy transparency, improving exchange rate management frameworks, and promoting the gradual implementation of inflation targeting—particularly for emerging economies such as China. The conclusions provide theoretical support and empirical evidence for optimizing monetary policy institutions and macroeconomic regulation strategies.

Graphical Abstract
The Role of Central Bank Independence and Policy Transparency in Inflation Targeting: A Comparative Empirical Analysis of Five Countries

Keywords
inflation targeting
central bank independence
policy transparency
monetary policy
international comparison
external shocks

Data Availability Statement
Data will be made available on request.

Funding
This work was supported by the 2025 College Student Innovation and Entrepreneurship Training Program Project under Grant 202513988003.

Conflicts of Interest
The author declares no conflicts of interest.

Ethical Approval and Consent to Participate
Not applicable.

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Cite This Article
APA Style
Song, Z. (2025). The Role of Central Bank Independence and Policy Transparency in Inflation Targeting: A Comparative Empirical Analysis of Five Countries. Journal of Social Systems and Policy Analysis, 2(4), 192–202. https://doi.org/10.62762/JSSPA.2025.547905
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TY  - JOUR
AU  - Song, Zhiming
PY  - 2025
DA  - 2025/12/17
TI  - The Role of Central Bank Independence and Policy Transparency in Inflation Targeting: A Comparative Empirical Analysis of Five Countries
JO  - Journal of Social Systems and Policy Analysis
T2  - Journal of Social Systems and Policy Analysis
JF  - Journal of Social Systems and Policy Analysis
VL  - 2
IS  - 4
SP  - 192
EP  - 202
DO  - 10.62762/JSSPA.2025.547905
UR  - https://www.icck.org/article/abs/JSSPA.2025.547905
KW  - inflation targeting
KW  - central bank independence
KW  - policy transparency
KW  - monetary policy
KW  - international comparison
KW  - external shocks
AB  - Inflation targeting has become a cornerstone framework for contemporary monetary policy governance, yet its effectiveness varies significantly across countries. This study employs panel data from five countries—New Zealand, Canada, South Korea, Poland, and South Africa—over the period 2010 to 2020 to empirically examine the impact mechanisms of central bank independence and policy transparency on inflation dynamics. The findings indicate that institutional independence of central banks significantly contributes to curbing inflation levels, enhancing policy credibility and implementation stability. Meanwhile, policy transparency effectively reduces inflation volatility by stabilizing public expectations and strengthening market communication. Macroeconomic control variables, including the share of foreign exchange reserves and GDP growth rate, also play a moderating role in inflation fluctuations. Regression results reveal that the two core variables are statistically significant at the 1% level, with robust explanatory power of the model. Further analysis incorporating institutional heterogeneity demonstrates path-dependent differences in policy design and outcomes between developed and transition economies. Building on these findings, this paper proposes relevant policy recommendations that underscore the importance of strengthening central bank independence, enhancing policy transparency, improving exchange rate management frameworks, and promoting the gradual implementation of inflation targeting—particularly for emerging economies such as China. The conclusions provide theoretical support and empirical evidence for optimizing monetary policy institutions and macroeconomic regulation strategies.
SN  - 3068-5540
PB  - Institute of Central Computation and Knowledge
LA  - English
ER  - 
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@article{Song2025The,
  author = {Zhiming Song},
  title = {The Role of Central Bank Independence and Policy Transparency in Inflation Targeting: A Comparative Empirical Analysis of Five Countries},
  journal = {Journal of Social Systems and Policy Analysis},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {2},
  number = {4},
  pages = {192-202},
  doi = {10.62762/JSSPA.2025.547905},
  url = {https://www.icck.org/article/abs/JSSPA.2025.547905},
  abstract = {Inflation targeting has become a cornerstone framework for contemporary monetary policy governance, yet its effectiveness varies significantly across countries. This study employs panel data from five countries—New Zealand, Canada, South Korea, Poland, and South Africa—over the period 2010 to 2020 to empirically examine the impact mechanisms of central bank independence and policy transparency on inflation dynamics. The findings indicate that institutional independence of central banks significantly contributes to curbing inflation levels, enhancing policy credibility and implementation stability. Meanwhile, policy transparency effectively reduces inflation volatility by stabilizing public expectations and strengthening market communication. Macroeconomic control variables, including the share of foreign exchange reserves and GDP growth rate, also play a moderating role in inflation fluctuations. Regression results reveal that the two core variables are statistically significant at the 1\% level, with robust explanatory power of the model. Further analysis incorporating institutional heterogeneity demonstrates path-dependent differences in policy design and outcomes between developed and transition economies. Building on these findings, this paper proposes relevant policy recommendations that underscore the importance of strengthening central bank independence, enhancing policy transparency, improving exchange rate management frameworks, and promoting the gradual implementation of inflation targeting—particularly for emerging economies such as China. The conclusions provide theoretical support and empirical evidence for optimizing monetary policy institutions and macroeconomic regulation strategies.},
  keywords = {inflation targeting, central bank independence, policy transparency, monetary policy, international comparison, external shocks},
  issn = {3068-5540},
  publisher = {Institute of Central Computation and Knowledge}
}

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